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Abstract  
Contractual agreements have become an accepted part of participation processes for 
athletes in a variety of sport contexts. Closer readings of these contracts, however, pose 
several questions regarding organizational intentions and motivations, the 
conceptualization of athletes as ‘workers’, and, representation parity. In this paper, we draw 
on four types of athlete contractual documents from both ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ sport 
settings across the globe. Our key considerations include: athletes’ ownership over their 
image and identities; medical and health disclosures; lifestyle, behavioral and body choices 
and restrictions beyond sport; adherence to organizational philosophy and commitments, 
and social media and publicity constraints. Our exegesis here encourages sport researchers 
to deliberate whose ‘wellbeing’ matters most when signing that seductive dotted line.  
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Introduction  
 For aspiring amateurs, new professional recruits or established elite athletes, 
contractual agreements are an accepted (legal) part of the participatory process. The 
prospect of high-level competition, potential corporate sponsorship opportunities, media 
representation, equipment and clothing, training support, insurance and health care 
coverage, travel and performance bonuses hold tempting promises for aspiring and/or 
successful athletes. The presence (and approval) of a written contract is often one of the 
nascent steps in formalising the relationship between such athletes and their local, regional, 
national, supra-national or international governing sport authorities. While athletes (and 
their entourages) may be primarily concerned with training, performance or financial 
resources, the possibility of competitive participation is frequently precipitated by (and 
often exclusively contingent upon) the acceptance of a binding pact. Although acting as a 
symbol of mutual understanding, the nature of contracts is to detail the terms and 
conditions of the athlete-sport administrator ‘employment’ relationship. Yet, the roles, 
remits, characteristics and intentions of the documents are becoming increasingly complex 
and nuanced as administrators attempt to amalgamate transparent and fair official 
participation policies in tandem with satisfying judicial duties to protect the organization, 
stakeholder interests and associated commercial sensitivities. Sport organizations are, too, 
designing contracts that encompass not only standard expectations and obligations, but 
also, traverse wider restrictions on athletes’ personal/private lives, identities and moral 
character. Within agreement processes, and with the allure and prestige of competitive 
representation at stake, however, athlete’s (unwavering) acceptance of their contracts 
often becomes a fait accompli. Though athletes (or their families and/or agents) may, 
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evidently, have some recourse to discuss their agreements, the ways in which sport 
organisations are using contracts to delimit, constrain and manufacture the relationship 
demonstrates that ethical and moral integrity (at the very least, the protection of 
sportspeople’s wellbeing) may be a subsidiary concern.  
Athlete contracts have received attention in recent years as scholars seek to articulate 
their place in athletes’ sporting lives and experiences. Previous research has focused, 
variously, on the lives of athletes as labourers, neo-liberal ideologies and the 
commodification of sport-work spaces, regulation and legislation, and, concomitant power 
relations and ethical concerns (e.g., Connor, 2009; McLeod, Lovich, Newman & Shields, 
2014; Roderick, 2006). At the forefront of this criticism have been examinations to reveal 
how the context, content and consequences of contracts affect athlete’s relationships with 
their sport organisations, and, their agency and autonomy within their career trajectories 
writ large. Referring to the National College Athletic Association’s (NCAA) tight control of 
the college sport system and athlete’s subsequent entry into the lucrative professional 
leagues, for example, Wong, Zola and Deubert (2008) note that stakes for athletes are 
incredibly high with not just financial incentives on offer, but, popularity, prestige and 
recognition. Moreover, in addition to being seduced by the allure of greater opportunities, 
during the amateur to professional transition athletes may be also confounded by an array 
of information from a variety of poor and conflicting sources (e.g., parents and family, 
peers, agents, coaches, teachers, marketing representatives and sponsors) that make 
navigating contractual terrain difficult and confusing. In conjunction, the process can also 
place young athletes under considerable pressure as they are forced to make decisions 
influencing their long term careers. Such is the state, Wong et al. (2008) lament, that 
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athletes (and their families) “are woefully unsophisticated and unprepared to navigate the 
process” (p.554-555). Noting the development of athlete contracts in the United States, 
Baker, Grady and Rappole (2012) add that the sport organisations (such as the NCAA) now 
yield considerable power over the lives and fate of athletes to the extent that latter have 
become marginalised in negotiation processes, and, lack any substantive ‘bargaining power’ 
or political voice to exercise their free will. As Eckert (2006) echoes, an illusion of choice and 
voice, contoured by the complexities of the bureaucratic process, essentially masks 
legitimate and meaningful contractual representation.  
 For the most part, contracts formalise an exclusive relationship between sport 
organisations and their athletes. However, the increasing demands of commercialised 
professional sport have necessitated that sport organisations establish ever-closer 
corporate partnerships as they seek to adequately resource their athletes, fulfil sporting 
commitments and (in some cases) generate revenue to ensure their economic sustainability 
(Carlson & O’Cass, 2012; Chappelet & Bayle, 2005; Ferrand & Pages, 1999). National 
Olympic Committees, international and national sport federations, and even local and 
regional bodies, for instance, often offset limited public funding by seeking corporate 
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements with domestic, transnational or international 
domestic partners. While such arrangements may seem commonsensical, they also have 
had implications for athlete contracts, and overall athlete management, as sport 
organisations become particularly sensitive toward the protection of their commercial 
enterprises and companies’ all-important brand identity and image. There has, Eckert (2006) 
attests, been a Hippocratic shift if the focus of sport organisations and their contractual 
approaches; namely, from doing no harm to the athlete, to doing no harm to their 
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commercial interests. Sport organisations’ corporate fears have, in this regard, led to the 
introduction (and increasing predominance) of moral and/or character clauses within 
contracts that while levied at athlete behaviour are, essentially, designed to protect the 
sport organisation and mitigate any risk (real or perceived) that the athlete might present to 
their enduring corporate relations.  
 Moral clauses, and/or clauses that impose restrictions upon the character, attitudes or 
athlete ‘conduct’ (in particular outside of sport), are, Auerbach (2005) notes, essentially a 
response to the paradigm shift sport-athlete-corporate relationship and the prevalent 
market-place climate of risk aversion. Such clauses (which examine shortly) provide the 
sport organisation and/or the corporate affiliate with the rights to rescind the contract, or, 
impose financial punishments or participation restrictions on athletes they deem to have 
brought the body or its business partners into disrepute. With the financial deals between 
sport organisations and companies often receiving exorbitant figures, the use of such 
clauses has, Auerbach (2005) adds, has become a normalised part of industry practice and a 
consequence of ideologies in which youth are  perceived as morally unstable, immature, 
potentially/inadvertently disruptive, malleable, contractually naïve, and, thus prone to 
present considerable commercial risk. To this end sport organisations (in association with 
the affiliated commercial partners), Auerbach (2005) highlights, are employing every more 
lengthier and articulate clauses to counter a wider variety of infringements and risky 
scenarios. Such broad brush strokes may afford the organisation legal scope to deal various 
athlete infractions, however, the extensive nature of clauses can also serve to obfuscate the 
athlete-organisation relationship and leave the athlete uncertain about the extent of their 
freedoms, abilities and responsibilities. The concomitant danger is that with the possibility 
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of lucrative deals on the line athletes appear willing to embrace whatever contractual 
conditions are laid out for them; moral and corporate image protection clauses included.   
 Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to re-energise debates that continue to 
problematise athletes as commodities. While this has been a topic of discussion in the 
literature for several decades (e.g., Ingham, Blissmer & Davidson, 1999; Roderick, 2006; 
Stewart, 1989; Vinnai, 1976), it appears from a contractual and organisational perspective, 
little has changed. Although appearing to act in athletes’ best interest (as evidenced to by 
the establishment of athlete commissions, ethics committees and the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport), sport organisations have still maintained a dominant hand in contract 
construction and negotiation processes. Such support, however, is predicted on dealing with 
athletes and their concerns once they are already in the elite sport system (or at least 
competing under the auspices of a national organization or professional body). The 
significance of our approach here is that we focus on the earlier stages of athletes’ careers, 
and, attend to specific role contracts play within transitional periods that might potentially 
change athletes’ sporting trajectories. Athletes, even with the potential assistance of agents, 
family members and/or coaches, appear to have little influence over the terms and 
conditions of their employment without necessarily jeopardizing their contractual 
acceptance, high performance participation, individual reputation and rapport with the 
organization. For us, what shapes athletes’ interactions and employment relations with their 
parent organization before they are officially ‘signed-on’ warrants much closer 
contemplation and critique. Our aim is to present a series of contract clauses that exemplify 
some of the issues regarding how sport organisations have continued to operationalise their 
institutional power and exert considerable (and questionable) authority over athletes’ 
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autonomy, lives, identities, freedoms and behaviours. In doing so, we encourage a 
reconsideration of athletes’ representation and participation in contractual processes and 
we advocate sport organisations to better account for athletes agency in their work. 
 
Conceptual Framework  
 Our critique is guided by Baker et al.’s (2012) articulations of consent theory, and, 
Auerbach’s (2005) examinations of organisational morality and corporate protection. 
Regarding the former, Baker et al. (2012) attend to the fairness of the bargaining process, 
and, the inequities of representation. They argue contracts comprise implicit bias that 
privileges sport organisations and the power they yield in the contractual negotiation 
process. This is referred to as the doctrine of unconscionability. The doctrine of 
unconscionability (also referred to as unconscionability, unconscionable bargaining [power], 
or inequality of bargaining power) has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework 
within contemporary contract law (Baker et al. 2012; Brown & Bicksacky, 2013; Hesselink, 
2013; Hillman, 2012; McKendrick, 2014; Posner, 1995; Priestley, 1986). Whereby classical 
contract theory presumes perfect conditions for contractual formation and implementation, 
that all parties have equitable resources, and, that all parties enter into contracts freely and 
partake in the bargaining process equally, unconscionability accounts for issues of inequity, 
representation and consent. Unconscionability, essentially, refers to instances where 
contractual terms, clauses and conditions are particularly unjust, and, inherently biased 
toward one particular party. “Unconscionability is not intended to erase freedom of 
contract,” Brown and Bicksacky (2013) remind us, “but to assure that the agreement has 
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resulted from real bargaining between parties who had freedom of choice and 
understanding” (p.214).  
 In understanding how we might advance practices of negotiation and consent, 
unconscionability is a useful tool. Namely, because it acknowledges that signees are to a 
degree fallible; that is, in this case not necessarily rational or informed. Moreover, it 
provides courts with the legal parameters to intervene in contractual disputes. To note, 
however, unconscionability is concerned primarily with contract construction, negotiation, 
acceptance and the initial consent processes rather than proceeding cases caused when 
terms, conditions or party expectations change or are infringed upon. Typically 
unconscionability becomes a concern when one of the party may be larger, better 
resourced, have superior or priori knowledge and thus be more informed, and/or have the 
power and jurisdiction to set contractual conditions (Baker et al., 2012; Brown & Bicksacky, 
2013; Hesselink, 2013). The emphasis within unconscionability, and indeed what matters in 
legally determining the grounds of the doctrine, is essentially on evidencing the exploitation 
of weakness (e.g., as a result of the age or limited experience of the lesser party, absence of 
priori knowledge, diminished mental capacity, and inability/limited opportunities for 
negotiation, inequitable resources and/or severe external pressures). Such a situation 
creates an imbalanced relationship that runs contrary to good conscience and faith, mutual 
understanding and reasonable expectation (Possner, 1995; Yee, 2001). As such, to enforce 
the contract could be considered unfair.  
Brown and Bicksacky (2013) identify two types of unconscionability, substantive and 
procedural. Substantive unconscionability focuses specifically on the unfair terms and 
consequences that might arise from their imposition. Procedural unconscionability, 
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however, “examines how each term became part of the contract and the actual process of 
bargaining” (Brown & Bicksacky, 2013, p.221). Procedural unconscionability is particularly 
relevant in the context of examining athlete contracts and the ethical presumptions and 
(administrative, economic, political) contextual conditions that precipitate their formation 
and influence athlete power when consenting. “Procedural unconscionability”, Brown and 
Bicksacky (2013) further, “can result from any of the following elements: (1) absence of 
meaningful choice; (2) superiority of bargaining power; (3) the fact that the contract is an 
adhesion contract; (4) unfair surprise; or (5) sharp practices and deception” (p.222). 
Unconscionability of this type often occurs in negotiations between larger parties (e.g., for 
our purposes, national governing bodies) and individual signees (e.g., athletes). Although 
inequitable terms and bargaining bias may be evident in other legal processes, 
unconscionability often occurs in the use of standardised contracts where 
‘boilerplate’/generic terminologies and clauses are employed, or, in contracts of adhesion 
(based on ‘take it or leave it’ principles). The issue with the formation of such contracts is 
that they do not adequately account for the aforementioned relationship inequities 
between the parties, appropriately allow the signee to exercise freewill, or provide 
opportunities for fairly negotiate the terms and conditions of acceptance (Brown & 
Bicksacky, 2013; McKendrick, 2014; Posner, 1995; Priestley, 1986).  
In sport, the unconscionability doctrine has received only limited attention; primarily 
from sport law scholars working in the United States investigating inequalities of negotiation 
and representation between the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) and its 
constituents (e.g, Baker et al., 2012; Hanlon, 2006; Johnson, 2012; Stippich & Kadence, 
2010). Such scholars argue that athlete contracts, as a distinct form of contract, require 
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closer scrutiny; largely due to the immense and increasingly substantive power large sport 
organisations (e.g., the NCAA) have been able to yield over athletes and the evidently 
limited opportunities athletes have available to participate in fair and just contractual 
construction and bargaining. Recognising the utility of the doctrine as both a theoretical 
framework and legal device, Baker et al. (2012) foreground unconscionability within their 
(sport-related) theory of consent. For Baker et al., the conditions of contemporary sport 
which hold lucrative participation, association and commercial appeal for athletes, have 
created a problematic contractual environment in which fairness, equity, trust, ‘good faith’, 
reason and ‘informed consent’ cannot be guaranteed (Hanlon, 2006; Johnson, 2012). This 
may lead to athlete passive acceptance of the contracts, lack of understanding of the 
implications of clauses and e/affects, and, potential employment tensions. In response, 
Baker et al. (2012) advocate changes including semantic improvements, legal 
representation, athlete engagement in negotiation, education, and, ‘opt-out’ possibilities (to 
which we will return later in our discussion).  
To add to this framework of unconscionability and consent, it is useful also to draw 
on Auerbach’s (2005) related contractual work on athletes and corporate protection. The 
prevailing concern for Auerbach (2005) is that sport organisations presuppose a duty of care 
to athletes, but, that this moral responsibility is a subsidiary of their predominant obligation 
to protect their corporate image. In the interests of safeguarding the organisation against 
perceived commercial threats, moral clauses that dictate athletes’ behaviours, ideals and 
values have become increasingly central to the contractual process. Auerbach (2005, p.3) 
states,  
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Morals clauses, also called public image, good conduct or morality clauses are 
provisions included in an endorsement contract granting the endorsee the right to 
cancel the agreement in the event the athlete does something to tarnish his or her 
image and, consequently, the image of the endorsee or its products. 
Whereas moral clauses of the past were deemed relatively inconsequential aspects of 
contractual processes, as professional stakes are raised (vis-à-vis endorsements, branding 
and revenue generation) moral clauses have become characteristic features of many sport 
contracts. Against the prevailing neo-liberal context in which protecting corporate 
partnerships matter, sport organisations are becoming particularly proactive in imposing 
moral clauses to preserve their lucrative economic relationships.  
The issue with this mentality is that it presents athletes as potentially problematic 
entities. As a result, within contracts, organisations tread a fine line between ‘clarifying’ 
acceptable behaviour that conforms to the institution’s professional ethos, versus 
preventing actions that are could have potentially damaging consequences on the 
endorsees. Tougher contractual provisions, Auerbach (2005) suggests, may be the supreme 
safeguard for corporate endorsees; however, such clauses (which we analyse below), 
evidence an institutionalised/normalised industry attitude in which athletes are 
conceptualised as young, morally unstable, potentially problematic, maliable, contractually 
naïve and compliant. We are, obviously, mindful here of the ground work done on docent 
‘active’ bodies, and, that within critical legal studies that scrutinises sport organisations’ 
regulatory powers and the consequence for protecting and advancing athlete’s interests 
and wellbeing (e.g., Connor, 2009; McLeod et al., 2014; Roderick, 2006; Stippich & Kadence, 
2010). While respecting this scholarship, we find that when used in conjunction with 
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unconscionability and consent scholars such as Baker et al. (2012), Auerbach (2005) helps 
articulate the inherent issues of morality and ethical concern and care that lay (or at least 
should lay) at the heart of the contractual process. Irrespective of the corporate and 
organisational demands that now characterise some individual’s sporting lives, Auerbach 
(2005) (and rehearsing unconscionability scholars here too) essentially remind us that 
athletes do not deserve to be marginalised and stigmatised by moral clauses that effectively 
most serve the interests of the sport organisation and its inequitable relationship power. 
Contract construction and negotiation should, thus, do better at evidencing a genuine 
concern for the athlete first and foremost.  
 
Methodology  
 Due to the difficulties in acquiring these contracts and the sensitive nature of these 
documents (i.e. several included confidentiality clauses), we sourced four contracts from 
national sport settings and a professional club; three from the national sport level in three 
countries and one from a professional club). Professional contracts, in this instance, referred 
to employment documents between athletes and professional clubs that are not publically 
funded. National level contracts mostly related to domestic team responsibilities and 
reflected funding and support coming primarily from the government via national 
administrative bodies. Due to the sensitive nature of the data, we have censored identifying 
elements. 
In keeping with the interpretive nature of this work, and the data, an inductive 
document analysis was undertaken (Bowen, 2009; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Stake, 
1995). Initially, data were coded (i.e. assigned a descriptive label) in light of meaningful 
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words, clauses and incidents (i.e. meaning units). Both researchers separately coded the 
contracts. The ‘meaning units’ were then discussed and the related clauses were compared 
and contrasted. The coded segments were aggregated in light of commonalities and/or 
distinctiveness (e.g., media, social media, physicality, health risk, corporate expectations). 
The resultant topics were collapsed into wider themes of which the discussion section is 
structured: athletes’ ownership over their image and identities; medical and health 
disclosures; lifestyle, behavioural and body choices and restrictions beyond sport; 
adherence to organisational philosophy and commitments, and social media and publicity 
constraints. 
 
Data and Discussion 
Athletes’ ownership over their image and identities 
 Elite athletes’ bodies undergo regular scrutiny as part of the spectacle of modern sport 
performance. This said, increased exposure via conventional and new media forms, and, the 
rampant commercialisation of sports practices writ large have exponentially increased 
surveillance and critique of athletic bodies and the meanings ascribed to, and inscribed 
upon, their flesh. The preservation and promotion of an athlete’s physicality and image, 
therefore, is of utmost importance. Thus it is unsurprising, perhaps, that contractual clauses 
have emerged that address, and in some cases dictate, athletes’ bodily forms in addition to 
merely their function. One of the most significant groups of clauses in this regard relate to 
athletes’ ownership over their image and identities. Clauses that stipulate that the athlete 
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must transfer the ownership of their image and identity to the organisation were common. 
For example:  
National Contract 1. The [athlete] agrees to allow [the organization] to use the 
[athlete’s] name, image, likeness, voice, performance and appearance in events or 
activities (including photographs, film and recordings of the [athlete’s] training, 
performance and appearance). No use is permitted under this clause whatsoever by 
any party if such use would be detrimental to the reputation of the [athlete] or 
otherwise derogatory or offensive. 
 
National Contract 2. not to allow Your Identity to be used by any party, including your 
own personal sponsors, for advertising, sponsorship, endorsement, fundraising, or 
promotional purposes, including on their websites and blogs, without the prior 
written approval of the [National Sporting Committee] Commercial Director. 
Here we find that any opportunities for athletes to have a say over their image and its 
presentation have been largely removed and any notion of consent has essentially been 
taken for granted as given. Thus, the assumption here is that the athlete agrees to passively 
comply and essentially forfeit their person. The athletes’ acceptance of such clauses could 
be considered a normalizing practice in the elite sport context in which sport organizations 
yield uncompromising authority which allows them to dictate the terms of participation as 
they desire. Such clauses imply that all aspects of the athlete relating to their person are 
parts of the ‘product’ to be acquired by the organization. Accepting this logic, aspects of the 
person that might be considered private, personal or sacred (e.g., in keeping with some 
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indigenous cultures this would refer to names, likenesses and photographic images) are no 
longer treated as such, rather are crafted as ‘property’ with substantial economic value to 
the organization; in doing so significantly undervaluing the symbolic value to the athlete and 
his/her cultural and belief systems. Thus, reiterating Baker et al.’s (2012) concerns regarding 
the unconscionability and fairness of the bargaining process, and, the inherent power 
imbalance.  
Organizations’ contractual controls of the body are even more pronounced when it 
comes to clauses relating to athlete’s corporal choices and lifestyle behaviors. This is 
particularly evident with regards to tattoos.  
National Contract 1. The [athlete] agrees not to display tattoos that may cause 
offence or conflict with the Commercial Partners whilst carrying out [sport]-related 
activities (including any activity required of the [athlete] under this agreement) at 
[competitions] and other events connected in any way with the squad or team.  
Guidance notes: Athletes using tattoos to bypass advertising rules relating to 
the [sporting organisation] and the Commercial Partners will be in breach of 
this contract. It is recommended that the [athlete] consult with the 
Performance Director if he/she has any tattoos that may be displayed which 
may be offensive and before getting any tattoos that may be displayed and 
may be offensive. 
The concerns here are not merely regarding the nature and visibility of existing ink, but also 
extend to ‘potential’ consequences, brand damage and offence that might be caused by 
tattoos the athlete may acquire in the future. It is not enough here that the organization 
mitigate the effects of existing tattoos, thus implying that they are willing to partially accept 
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this form of identity expression, but that ultimately the organization, having already 
assumed ‘ownership’ of the athlete, have the right to intervene if and when a tattoo may 
conflict with their brand identity or commercial agendas. Interestingly, these clauses are not 
a discernable feature of the professional contract we examined.  
With clauses such as those above, the issues are twofold: firstly, tattoos may infringe 
upon or have the potential to disrupt the organization’s commercial relationships; secondly, 
that possibly offensive tattoos are problematic to the ethos of organization and the 
corporate image it wishes to protect. Tattoos are a normative way for people to personalize 
and communicate the self; giving it a positive distinction (Atkinson, 2003; Dickson, Dukes, 
Smith & Strapko, 2015; Hawkes, Senn & Thorn, 2004). However, the clauses here suggest 
that the right to tattoo acquisition is no longer solely an athlete’s choice beyond the sport 
context, but rather, a potential behavior to be controlled, monitored and approved as part 
the organization’s commercial strategies and surveillance measures. Rehearsing Auerbach, 
tattoos, thus, present a risk to the organization that necessitates contractual mediation. 
Such opportunities might exist as part of broader negotiation discussions, nevertheless, the 
point here is that with the contracts we examined is that organizations have assumed that 
a) the athlete’s skin is merely an additional entity to be owned and risk to mitigate and b) 
that the athlete’s identity expression and wishes remain subsidiary to their intentions.  
 
Medical and health disclosures 
 Further to concerns about the athletes’ images and inked exteriors, organisations have 
extended this interest into the overall quality of the ‘product’ in which they wish to invest, 
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that is, the state of the athlete’s body, health and wellbeing. For the organisation, the 
emphasis here appears to be ensuring the athlete in which they are investing, arrives to he 
organisation and maintains themselves in optimum condition throughout the duration of 
their employment. Medical and health clauses, to this end, serve as effective ways to 
evaluate and monitor athletes’ bodies while adding a useful safety mechanism for the 
organisation particularly in cases where the quality of an athlete’s physique and wellbeing 
might deteriorate and mayn potentially jeopardise their performance. The clauses below 
demonstrate the extent to which the organisations expect athletes to disclose medical and 
health-related concerns. 
National Contract 2. It is an essential requirement of this Agreement that the 
[Committee] is kept fully informed if you are suffering any physical or mental injury, 
illness, condition or impairment that might prevent you from preparing or competing 
in the [event] to the highest possible standard. As such, you agree: 
a) to disclose to the [organisation] any illness, injury or condition that may 
prevent you preparing for, or competing in, the [event] to the highest 
possible standard as soon as you are aware of it. 
 
National Contract 3. Any information obtained about you, that relates to your fitness 
or otherwise ability to compete in the [event] to the highest possible standard in the 
[competition] shall also be made available to the [Team Manager] or their nominee. 
The [Team Manager] also reserves the right to disclose this information to other 
relevant [Committee] personnel where [the Team Manager] considers this genuinely 
necessary. 
 
 
18 
As the clauses indicate, the athletes must comply with the full disclosure of their medical 
histories. However, there appears to be some scope for the athlete to judge and determine 
what they choose to reveal or conceal. This may seem in the athlete’s best interests by 
enabling the disclosure of information to remain at their discretion while concomitently 
demonstrating the organisation’s interests in the protection of their wellbeing and health. 
The concern here, as articulated in the National Contract 3 clause, is that the contracts and 
organisation’s intentions transend the conventional privacy of the doctor-patient priviledge. 
No longer are athletes’ health privacies protected by medical convention, instead the 
ownership of health and wellbeing information becomes the preserve of the organisation 
who may utilise and freely disceminate it as and when they deem appropriate.  
 In addition to the acquision and use of medical and health information, in some cases 
organisations have extended their power within contracts to include the ability to sanction 
athletes whose bodies and behaviours do not conform to expectation. In the clause below, 
the organisation has the capacity to admonish athletes in writing (and thus be on record) for 
their weight gains (note: no reference here to weight loss). Moreover, the consequences of 
body infractions extend to monetary fines. 
Professional Contract. The [athlete] agrees that if at any time the [athlete’s] weight is 
more than xx kilograms, each time [the club] shall have the right to admonish in 
writing the [athlete] and after 15 days, if the weight is not reduced below said limit, 
to impose on [the athlete] a fine of up to 5% of [the athlete’s] annual compensation 
without bonuses.  
Our point here is to highlight that sensitivies and subjectivities surrounding athletes’ health 
no longer are exclusively theirs alone. Not unlike with their image or inking, health 
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knowledge in this case has become divorced from the individual and subsumed as another 
facet of the organisation’s authority and becomes a tool in maintaining the inherent power 
bias in their athlete relations (Auerbach, 2005).  
 
Lifestyle, behavioural and body choices and restrictions beyond sport 
 The clauses regarding body control and organisation intervention do not stop here. 
Rather, the clauses extend to manage athlete’s lives and behaviours outside of sport. While 
the intention of the clauses might be performance orientated (e.g., by ensuring the athletes’ 
peak performance), they raise concerns about where the remit of the organisation ends and 
the athlete may be separated from their sporting obligations and work. 
Professional Contract. The club shall grant the player a minimum of 35 calendar days 
of holidays per year of duration of this contract. Given the particular characteristic of 
the activity, said period of holidays should be spent entirely from 1 [month] until 4 
[subsequent month] of each year of duration of this contract. 
 
National Contract 1. The [athlete] understands and accepts that [the sport] and other 
training activities carry a risk of physical injury and the [athlete] agrees to take all 
reasonable care to avoid causing harm to [the athlete] and others and agrees not to 
undertake any hazardous or dangerous activities without the prior consent of the 
Performance Director (a ‘hazardous or dangerous activity’ is one that requires special 
insurance). 
 
 
20 
Here we see a shift in the contracts from athletes considered as potential liabilities to 
athletes considered as ‘investments’ needing to be protected. What appears to matter is 
how organisations use contracts to insure/ensure the quality and commercial viability of 
their product. Such clauses might also serve as a test of athlete’s loyalty and commitment to 
the ‘cause’. Recalling Auerbach (2005), our examination reiterates organisations’ 
presumptions about the alleged necessity of regulating athletes’ possibly wayward lives, 
and, the real or perceived threats to the institution’s image, identity and success.  
 
Adherence to organisational philosophy and commitments 
An additional part of the organisation’s ways of protecting its image, and maintaining 
their influence over athletes’ non-sporting lives, has been the development of clauses 
relating to institutional philosophies (often alternatively couched as ‘moral codes’, ‘values’, 
‘ideals’, ‘mission’, ‘culture’ and ‘ethos’). Within the organisations examined in this paper, 
their philosophies generally emphasised the exceptional environment set by high 
performance/elite participation. Such settings necessitate behavioural, moral, ethical and 
principled standards of the highest order. Moreover, they assume athlete’s adherence to 
codes of practice, performance and existence that align with the organisation’s aims and 
ambitions. 
National Contract 1. The [athlete] recognises that, as an elite competitor within the 
HPP, [the athlete’s] behaviour will reflect on [Organisation] and the sport. 
Accordingly, the [athlete] agrees to conduct himself in a fit and proper manner at all 
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times during the Membership Period. Further, the [athlete] agrees that, at all times 
during the Membership period, he will:  
a. make a positive commitment to supporting and achieving the aims and 
objectives of the [High performance programme] and as and when reasonably 
requested by [Organisation], use all due skill and ability in promoting the 
Commercial partners. 
b. project a favourable and positive image of the sport and the [Organisation’s] 
programmes and the Commercial Partners by adopting high standards of 
behaviour and sensible appropriate dress standards when appearing in public 
or carrying out duties in relation to the HPP; this includes showing 
consideration to other travellers and guests when travelling or staying away 
with [Organisation’s] squads or teams. 
As identified here, ‘acceptable behaviour’, ‘conduct yourself in a fit and proper manner’, 
demonstrate ‘appropriate respect and understanding’, making a ‘positive contribution’, 
‘behaving reasonably’ and with ‘restraint’, projecting a ‘favourable and positive image’, 
‘maintaining a positive attitude’ have become the standard contractual nomenclature to 
this effect. Imbedded in these clauses is a lofty idealistic sporting altruism that restricts 
individualism and expression.  
By complying with the organisation’s philosophy, athletes are also accepting their 
roles in the maintenance and development of the business and its brand. As such, contracts 
(which essentially frame athletes as corporate employees) have been put to use to ensure 
individuals’ commitment and loyalties extend beyond the performative and service the 
greater needs and agendas of the organisation as a commercial entity (Baker et al. 2012). In 
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the contracts we examined, athletes are routinely obligated to satisfy the organisation (and 
help fulfill corporate relations) by agreeing to give their non-training time, energy and 
participation to support ‘the cause’.  
National Contract 1. The athlete agrees to engage in a maximum of eight full days of 
Appearances in any year of the Membership Period, to include three days in support 
of [xx] Funded Programmes. Attendance at an Appearance shall be calculated in half 
days units of not more than four hours each. The [athlete] shall make these 
attendances where reasonably requested to do so by [Organisation] or the [Sports 
Organisation], save that the [athlete] shall not be obliged to adhere to any such 
requests if to do so would clearly conflict with or otherwise impair the performance 
of his other obligations under this Agreement, in particular as to training and 
competition. 
Such a clause echoes our earlier point regarding the extended influence of the organisation 
in being able to shape athletes’ lives outside of sport. Here, it appears that participation at 
the elite level asks more of athletes and their lives than merely performative perfection, 
rather they expect athletes to fulfill organisational obligations. Clauses that specify athletes 
undertake organisational ‘work’ require that they ‘buy into’ the organisational philosophies, 
become smiling advocates and willingly accept the institution’s ways (while silencing any 
potential opinions they may have to the contrary). 
 
Social media and publicity constraints 
 
 
23 
The aforementioned clauses appear designed to ensure athletes appropriately serve 
the best interests of the organisations they represent. Athletes, whose image and value is 
built upon their sporting success and public popularity are a key part in how the 
organisation projects itself at the national and international level and engages with external 
stakeholders. Within this imperative, impression management matters. In terms of 
operating a successful business enterprise that has a reputable public image it thus might 
make sense for sport organizations to exert tight controls over athletes; specifically in terms 
of what they say and how they might represent the brand. In this regard, sport bodies, not 
unlike those elsewhere, are paying particularly close attention to their internet presence as 
their prominent brand interface and the consequences for public relations (Christ, 2015). 
However, given the rapid growth in social media, in which new technology modes have 
presented athletes with fresh opportunities for interaction and exposure, sport 
organizations seem ill equipped to effectively mitigate athletes’ actions online. What results, 
as evidenced by the clauses, is a generic approach that attempts to dictate the terms of e-
participation and police both real and perceived incursions that might disrupt commercial 
agendas, effect stakeholder relations and generate public criticism. Sites and applications 
such Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat and Instagram have precipitated the need for 
organizations to carefully consider how they balance athletes’ desires for identity 
expression, fan interaction and self-promotion, and, protecting their own reputation and 
commercial interests (Frederick, Clavio, Pedersen, & Burch, 2014; Lebel & Danylchuk, 2014). 
National Contract 1. The athlete agrees not to make any public statement which is 
derogatory to [the organisation], the HPP, any Commercial Partner or any of the 
bodies working to promote high performance sport…, nor to make any public 
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statement which constitutes a ‘personal’ attack upon another sporting competitor. 
Fair comment upon a fellow competitor made without the use of offensive language 
where the substance of the comment is known (or can be shown) to be true will not 
constitute a ‘personal attack’… 
 
National Contract 3. Are entitled to make public comment or communicate with the 
media relating to your personal preparation for the [event], providing those 
comments or communications comply with the remainder of this clause; not to make 
or endorse any public statements that may have a negative effect on any member of 
the actual or potential Team either at or in the build-up to the [event]. 
a. Are not to create an actual or implied connection between any personal 
sponsors and the [national] Team, [organisation], its Commercial Partners…in 
any forum including Social Media, blog or internet platform. 
As evidenced by these clauses, the potential for athletes to ‘misuse’ social media represents 
a considerable liability that warrants proactive mitigation. Such clauses aim to circumvent 
infringements and legal/economic damage to the organisation. Thus we fall back into an 
institutionalised mentality whereby athletes are considered volatile, problematic, ‘risky’, 
unpredictable entities whose lives (in and beyond the performative sport context) 
necessitate manipulation and control.  
 
Rethinking clauses and a/effects 
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 Underlying the aforementioned concern over moral clauses, and with the discontent 
over sport contracts in general, are significant issues regarding athlete welfare. What is 
important, and what we question, is the prevailing ethical high-ground organisations 
presume, and, the de-centring and marginalisation of the athlete in this process. Our 
suggestions here are guided by the encouragement, too, of Brown and Bicksacky (2013) 
who admit that especially where unconscionability, moral infringement and ‘informed’ 
consent are concerned, contract construction and negotiation is an inexact science and 
interpretation can be particularly subjective. “There will always be”, Brown and Bicksacky 
(2012) note, “some imbalance between contracting parties in terms of power, wealth, 
understanding, experience, and information” (p.255). As such, what is needed is for 
concerns over individual freedoms, liberties and agency to be fundamental to contract 
formation. In practice, they suggest, this means development of improved organisational 
guidelines that better account for the irrationality and lack of priori knowledge of the signee 
and allow possibilities for greater modification and negotiation.  
An effective contract should, at least, be designed to protect both/all parties. As 
Auerbach (2005) reiterates, sports contracts, certainly with regards to the unconscionability 
of terms, are fundamentally flawed in this regard. With the participation stakes so high and 
with the means to elite participation at the discretion of the sport body, the organisation is 
naturally at an unfair advantage in terms of parity of representation in the negotiation 
process. As the clauses reveal, such a priviledged position enables the organisation to 
preserve their best interests, first and foremost, and, to conceptualise athlete wellbeing as 
both an investment to be stringently protected and their behaviour a liability to be 
moderated.  
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 To crystalise our conerns at this juncture, it is possible to make several 
recommendations that offer ways we might rethink contractual approaches and enhance 
athlete-organisation relations. One primary recommendation, we believe, should be for the 
organisation to acknowledge the inherent power imbalance that exists as a normalised part 
of the employment sphere, but that is fortified by the type of contracts they utilise. Towards 
this end, it appears that organisations have adopted contracts from the corporate world and 
have made slight modifications to reflect the physical nature of sports ‘work’, however, as 
evidenced in the above clauses, these contracts aren’t a ‘best fit’ for the contemporary 
sport world. We recommend that organisations consider the purpose of these contracts in 
terms of the high performance culture and objectives and if the pupose can be achieved via 
an alternate forum (e.g., athlete workshop, informal discussion). Such a suggestion might go 
some way in recognising the athletes’ agency and, consequently, build positive relations 
between the athlete and the organisation. Moreover, this approach might allow the 
organisation to still preserve its public and commercial integrity in tandum with enabling 
individual’s greater autonomy and opportunity to exercise their own judgement and free 
will. Should organisations not be willing to forego contracts, it is worth encouraging athletes 
to negotiate the terms. This collaborative effort will allow for a mutual understanding and 
appreciation of each others’ roles.  
 In the event that contracts are used, we suggest first, that athletes critically 
understand what they are signing up to. This may entail taking time to carefully read 
contracts and seek independent advice, but, we suggest might start with simply more 
rigorously questionning why contracts comprise particular inclusions and exclusions. Sport 
organisations may be increasingly adept at delimiting their relationships with athletes, yet 
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athletes’ compliance and complacency should not be taken for granted. In addition we 
recommend then that athetes should also be supported by their representative in 
understanding their ability and right to object to particular clauses. This is certainly the case 
if they feel there are clauses that might compromise their individual identity and expression, 
go beyond the performative requirements of the sport, or push their basic rights, freedoms 
and liberties. Additionally, athletes should advocate for alternatives to contracts as a way 
reminding the organsiation of their agency.  
 
Conclusion  
Our purpose in this paper was to use contractual clauses as a means of extending 
previous considerations of athletes as particular forms of workers. In examining a range of 
clauses across several different sport organisations, it is possible to appreciate the ways in 
which the non-sport sector employment ethos has manifested itself in the construction of 
athlete contracts and inherent organisation power relations therein. As we have evidenced 
across five themes: athletes’ ownership over their image and identities; medical and health 
disclosures; lifestyle, behavioural and body choices and restrictions beyond sport; adherence 
to organisational philosophy and commitments, and social media and publicity constraints; 
our concerns focused on whose wellbeing contracts essentially protect. Although the 
organisation might argue that these obligations and duties outlined in the contracts are 
conducive to the ‘effective’ management of their programmes, we argued that contracts 
implied adherence to the organisations’ respective high performance agendas. Moreover, as 
these particular contracts indicate, while athlete protection is important, what is valued 
more is organisational safeguarding. With this in mind, contracts are riddled with 
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assumptions about who athletes are and what they might do. This seems to be a reactive 
response to risks that are with or without precedent. Building on the theoretical 
foundations we have outlined (i.e. Auerbach, 2005; Baker et al. 2012), we advocate a move 
away from the athlete as a passive participant in the process, and, toward greater 
acknowledgement of the athlete’s interests in contractual construction, negotiation and 
implementation. Our more ‘radical’ hope would be to arrive at a point at which written 
contracts become superfluous to participatory requirements at the elite level. Such a 
paradigm shift would need to be precipitated by organisations abandoning their neo-liberal 
corporate agendas and advancing a more empathetic, trusting, and appreciative approach 
to athlete care and wellbeing.  
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